Sense-data (Part One)

12Apr07

Thesis Statement

            Before the paper proper begins I wish to state as clearly as possible my thesis, which is multifaceted. The most important point I’m trying to make is that sense-data is a flawed concept, and that these flaws are the result of the historical factors that motivated Russell and Moore, which are perhaps still relevant.

Section One: Illusion  

What is an illusion? Simply put illusion is when someone is deceived. When something appears to be but isn’t. Take for instance a circular coin. Given a difference of angle the same coin can look circular and look elliptical. When the circular coin looks elliptical an illusion is said to be taking place. This instance of illusion is local. And this can be said to be a basic example of the argument from illusion. But what exactly is the argument from illusion? Simply put it looks –something- like this:

AFI1

1. There exists a straight stick.
2. And there is an environment composed of two physical mediums.
3. The stick is placed in both mediums at once.
4. When the straight stick is in both mediums it appears bent.
5. But the physical stick remains the same: straight.
6. Therefore, the physical stick is not numerically identical to the appearance of the stick.

While AFI1 is a good way to look at the argument from illusion, AFI1 isn’t –apparently- a common way of looking at the argument from illusion. An example from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy will demonstrate:

AFI2

1. When viewing a strait stick half-submerged in water, one sees (or is directly aware of) something bent.
2. No relevant physical thing is bent in this situation.
3. Therefore, in this situation, one sees something non-physical.
4. What one sees in this situation is the same kind of thing that one sees in a normal (non-illusory) perception.
5. Therefore, in normal perception, one sees non-physical things.

As you can see, AFI1 and AFI2 come to very different conclusions. Both point out that the physical thing is not numerically identical to the appearance of the thing. (AFI1 explicitly states this, AFI2 implies it because if x was numerically identical to something y and x was physical and y was nonphysical then this would involve a logical contradiction.)  But the importance is not the similarities but in the differences, AFI1 merely supports the presence of two objects. AFI2 supports not only the presence of two objects but also makes a claim about the nature of their existence (physical or nonphysical).

      The differences between AFI1 and AFI2 demonstrate their inherent prejudices. AFI1 is attempting to lay the groundwork for a rejection of sense-data, while AFI2 is an attempt to justify the existence of sense-data. As you can see the way I set the problem out is very different from the way the argument from illusion has been traditionally set out. My question is why? Which will be addressed in the next section, along with the question: what exactly is sense-data? But before moving on, time for a quick summary.

Summary

An example of an illusion is when an individual sees a bent stick when really the stick is straight. The argument from illusion has traditionally been formalized in a style similar to AFI2, but AFI2 is biased. AFI1 is biased as well but the next section will attempt to show that AFI1’s biases are justified while AFI2 commits an error of logic.  

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