Sense-data (Part Two)

12Apr07

Section Two: Sense-data  

Before jumping into a deeper analysis of AFI1 & AFI2 we need to address the issue of sense-data. Mainly what exactly is it? If we accept AFI2, sense-data is a non-physical thing unique from the relevant physical object. If we accept AFI1, sense-data would merely be something unique from the “straight physical stick”, this other entity could just as well be physical. So the question now becomes, which understanding of ‘sense-data’ is more accurate? My answer will be neither, and for the sake of this paper sense-data will be used in as a neutral term –for the moment. But for the sake of information I will make the claim that while Moore and Russell did not claim sense-data to be mind-dependent, many other philosophers have, but back to the arguments.

AFI1 and AFI2 both could establish the existence of a mind neutral sense-data. But AFI1 asserts the existence of a completely neutral sense-data, while AFI2 claims it is non-physical and is only neutral when it comes to questions of the mind. But another division is occurring here. AFI1 is not claiming sense-data to be mind-dependent or mind- independent (if mind-dependent the ‘sense-data’ resides in the mind, if mind-independent it resides in the world.) So those are the two questions we have to keep in mind about sense-data: “is it physical or non-physical?” and the separate but related question “is it mind-dependent or mind-independent”? For the sake of clarity let’s look what the combination of these factors would give us:

Sense-data	Mind-dependent (non-physical)	Mind-dependent(physical)	Mind-independent
Physical	Dualism	Materialism	Materialism
Non-physical	Dualism	Dualism	Dualism

The table shows us that AFI1 & AFI2 both by default eliminate Idealism (the belief that all things are mental) because AFI1 and AFI2 both mention physical objects. (This is a question I’ll let simmer until the section on idealism.) So we now have some idea of the metaphysical questions involved. But know it’s time to turn back to the logic at hand.

            Without thinking or AFI1 or AFI2 let’s think about the argument from illusion in general. Any formation of the argument from illusion is based off this simple problem:

1. There is a stick such that the stick is straight. (something like ∃xSx)
2. There is a stick such that the stick is not-straight. (∃x¬Sx)

This would involve a logical contradiction. So we are left with two options:

(The complete section is here section-tw1.doc)  

 

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