Sense-data (Part Three)

13Apr07

Section Three: Motivation

            The case has now been made for the fact that sense-data was merely the result of an error in language and not a solution mandated on the metaphysical level. So we have successfully addressed the primary logical questions involved. The remainder of this paper will be historical in nature, and will be an attempt to understand why Russell and Moore might have found the idea of sense-data appealing. It is my opinion that their unique motivations will play a crucial role in understanding how sense-data developed.

            A common motivating factor for both Russell and Moore was there dislike for idealism, which is the doctrine that everything is mental (as opposed to physical or material). But while
Moore’s prime motivating factor –that I am aware of- was a dislike of idealism, Russell’s prime motivating factor was a dislike of monism. (One of the reasons contemporarily philosophy has such an extreme dislike of sense-data arises from the fact that contemporary philosophy is dominated by a monistic metaphysical school of thought known as materialism (the belief that all things are physical)). But what exactly is monism?

            At its most general monism is a belief that everything is made out of one substance. Materialism will serve to demonstrate. A materialist believes that in the end everything is reducible to one type of substance: the material, or put more simply a substance that takes up space, has mass and all the other properties we associate with the physical. While a monism of this kind (known as substance monism) doesn’t sound awful, in Russell’s era people didn’t believe in substance monism but absolute monism or attributive monism (both of which will be dealt with in greater detail in the section on monism).

            What is important to note is that the neutral sense-data envisioned by Russell and Moore met both parties needs. It allowed Russell and Moore to do away with idealism, but allowed
Moore to hold onto monism and Russell the chance to flirt with pluralism. The table from section two will once more illustrate:

Sense-data

Mind-dependent (mind= soul/non-physical)

Mind-dependent (mind= brain/physical)

Mind-independent

Summary

Having dealt with the primary logical issues involved in the argument form illusion, this section concentrates on the historical. By asking why Russell and Moore would adopt the argument from illusion, and why they viewed sense-data (as neutral) the way they did. The section pointed out that while
Moore was motivated purely by his distaste of idealism, Russell was also motivated by his dislike for monism. The section concludes by pointing out that these motivations perhaps played a role in the development of sense-data (in the early days) as a neutral entity.

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