Sense-data (Part four)

14Apr07

Section Four: Idealism

Idealism is the belief that everything is reducible to the mental (as opposed to the physical). The most controversial claim I’m going to make is that the argument from illusion happens to kill two birds with one stone. It is not only a problem with perceptual and epistemological impact but also a metaphysical impact (for Russell et al.). But before I am able to make the claim that the argument from illusion is directly related to Russell and sense-data let’s make explicit
Moore’s critique of idealism that was published in 1903 as The Refutation of Idealism.

In this paper
Moore offered a critique of idealism in a concentrated effort to disprove the notion that esse is percipi, or in plain English: that whatever is, is experienced. But before we get bogged down in details let me make my case as simply and boldly as possible. The simple fact of the matter is the argument from illusion (in its traditional form AFI2), if true, utterly destroys the notion that whatever is, is perceived. The whole point of the argument from illusion is that a lot of things exist (like the straight stick) but we are constantly seeing an illusion. But that’s not all.

Even if we are not always seeing an illusion, the case of the glass in water is the only case we need. Because we can make a very strong argument that there is a contradiction and so we are not seeing the actual stick, and if we make this claim in a worldview framed by esse is percipi then we have done a lot more then just change the appearance of the stick. We’ve destroyed, and have resurrected a small part of the universe (if you’re a certain type of monist that would involve destroying indestructible monads, how embarrassing).

In Section One we asked why the argument from illusion has traditionally been formulated in a certain way. If there is one reason it should be formulated as AFI2 this is it. But while this is a way of disproving the idea that whatever is, is perceived it is not the means
Moore used to disprove it.
Moore makes the claim that: the idealist merely assumes that what is is the same as what is perceived (1.∃xBx 2.∃xPx, where x= object, B= being (esse), and P= perceived (percipi)). But
Moore says not only do idealists merely assume this; they also don’t assume it and there exists a good reason not to assume it. He says this:

“I am suggesting that the Idealist maintains that the object and subject are necessarily connected, mainly because he fails to see that they are distinct, that they are two, at all. When he thinks of ‘yellow’ and when he thinks of the ‘sensation of yellow,’ he fails to see that there is anything whatever in the latter which is not in the former. This being so, to deny that yellow can ever be apart from the sensation of yellow is merely to deny that yellow can ever be other than it is; since yellow and the sensation of yellow are absolutely identical. To assert that yellow is necessarily an object of experience is to assert that yellow is necessarily yellow—a purely identical proposition, and therefore proved by the law of contradiction alone. Of course, the proposition also implies that experience is, after all something distinct from yellow—else there would be no reason for insisting that yellow is a sensation: and that the argument thus both affirms and denies that yellow and sensation of yellow are distinct, is what sufficiently refutes it.” (442)

So this demonstrates that esse is percipi is analytical truth (because it is a statement of identity) so to prove its validity we must claim that esse simply equals percipi. But the argument advanced by the idealist doesn’t do this at all. The end result is that argument forwarded by the idealists disproves itself. To summarize formally: the idealist must assert: 1.∃xBx 2.∃xPx 3. P=B, where x= object, B= being (esse), and P= perceived (percipi). But what they in the end assert is not 3.P=B but P≠B. Not only do they assert it but we assert it and for good reason. The common man thinks there is something very different between the wavelength that is yellow, and the sensation of yellow and so should we.

Summary

            After a brief overview of what idealism is (the belief that everything is reducible to the mental), the section highlights the fact that idealism, historically, is based off the preposition that ‘esse is percipi’. The paper points out that if one accepted this as the case the argument from illusion would not merely be an argument making an epistemological claim but also ontological or metaphysical one as well. But the paper also points out the fact that the argument from illusion is an argument by Russell, while
Moore takes a separate but complimentary and earlier approach. The section then explained that ‘esse is percipi’ is an analytical truth but is self-defeating because idealists assert that ‘esse’ and ‘percipi’ are distinct. (
Moore’s paper makes it seem just as foolish to assert ‘esse is percipi” is a synthetic statement so in the end there doesn’t seem to be a way out.)

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