Mind/Body

In short: a possible future proof

cranderson — Sat, 26 May 2007 20:48:28 +0000

Over the last few weeks I haven’t been up to much at all. Before the summer started I came up with a brief idea for a test to determine the existence of a soul. Here it is in short.

From my understanding if one were to travel at the speed of light, no matter the distance, it would seem “instantaneous”.

So let us say X traveled 20 light years at the speed of light. X shouldn’t have any experiences or thoughts during those 20 years.

But what if X did? If X did then it would be proof that their is some part of X is not material or that physics is wrong.
Not a perfect test. But I think anyone would admit: trying to prove the existence of something of which nothing is known about is a tall order indeed.

Madrid Changed Overnight

cranderson — Tue, 24 Apr 2007 13:29:56 +0000

I remember watching an episode of the West Wing a long time ago. One of the cheese days, the day the cartographers came to complain about how our maps perpetuated a North/South divide. In the same line but slightly less serious is the redrawing of the Madrid Metro.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1695587.ece

Before and After pictures to come.

Fascist America

cranderson — Tue, 24 Apr 2007 13:13:04 +0000

http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,2064157,00.html

Not that I quite agree with the idea. Another post off topic but until I can write about a phil topic I’ll at least give some of you some politics to read over.

Seems to be written by an American from word choice. Though the Guardian could just be amazingly pushy.

On the French Election

cranderson — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 22:03:05 +0000

A little off topic for a blog on philosophy but I’d just like to register my joy. In 2002 Le Pen took us all by surprise and it is nice to see that not only has his total percentage of the vote drop, but also there was a higher turnout this time around, suggesting that a majority of people don’t feel any sympathy for Le Pen’s views.

The only slightly disconcerting thought is the fact that Sarkozy has co-opted (to some extent) Le Pen’s views regarding immigration. Not only that, but the FN, UMP, and PS all were preaching conservatives social values. Making me wonder what exactly prompted an increase in turn out?

What will be really interesting is to see if Sarkozy’s photo-op with Bush will come to haunt him in the second round.

Sense-data (Part Five)

cranderson — Sun, 15 Apr 2007 21:53:25 +0000

Section Five: Monism

While in the last section we discussed idealism -in particular the critique of idealism offered by
Moore- the time has come to deal with monism. Which Russell admits was a motivating factor in his early work, as he admits in My Philosophical Development: “I think
Moore was most concerned with the rejection of idealism, while I was most interested in the rejection of monism. (54)” As it has been stated before; monism is the belief at its most basic level that the entire world is reducible to a single substance (substance monism). An example would be idealism and materialism. But there is a more extreme form of monism that claims everything is reducible to a certain type of object, or category of objects (attributive monism). An example would be Leibniz’s monads, which not only share in common the fact that they are mental, but also the fact that they are all “souls”. But, yet again, there is still a more extreme form of monism that is the belief that everything is not reducible to the same substance, and the same category, but inevitably to the very same object. So in the end there only exists a single entity. This is what is known as absolute monism, of which pantheism is a type.

All (or most) of this would be refuted by AFI2/C1, because AFI2/C1 establishes the existence of physical entities and non-physical entities. Which I believe was a motivating factor for Russell. Who wanted desperately to do away with monism, but it is AFI2 coupled with C1 that, I think, in the end makes AFI2 invalid. So in the grand scheme of things this is important because while AFI2 coupled with C1 disprove monism. ARI1 coupled with C2 does not disprove monism. Which is good (because it doesn’t threaten materialism or at least not monism), but is also bad because if the objection isn’t derived from AFI2/C1 it seems to leave open the possibility for idealism. Because AFI2/C1 claims two types of substances, while AFI1/C2 claims only one type of substance. And while this is good for materialism, it is almost just as good for idealism. The final resolution of the dispute seems to come down to Ockham’s razor.

Summary

The section provided support for the claim that Russell was motivated by a rejection of monism, and described what monism is (belief in one substance… category… or thing). It concluded with an analysis of how AFI1 & AFI2 and C1 & C2 were related to this issue, making note of the fact that while AFI2/C1 rejects monism, AFI1/C2 not only does not reject monism but does not reject idealism directly.

Sense-data (Part four)

cranderson — Sat, 14 Apr 2007 22:11:14 +0000

Section Four: Idealism

Idealism is the belief that everything is reducible to the mental (as opposed to the physical). The most controversial claim I’m going to make is that the argument from illusion happens to kill two birds with one stone. It is not only a problem with perceptual and epistemological impact but also a metaphysical impact (for Russell et al.). But before I am able to make the claim that the argument from illusion is directly related to Russell and sense-data let’s make explicit
Moore’s critique of idealism that was published in 1903 as The Refutation of Idealism.

In this paper
Moore offered a critique of idealism in a concentrated effort to disprove the notion that esse is percipi, or in plain English: that whatever is, is experienced. But before we get bogged down in details let me make my case as simply and boldly as possible. The simple fact of the matter is the argument from illusion (in its traditional form AFI2), if true, utterly destroys the notion that whatever is, is perceived. The whole point of the argument from illusion is that a lot of things exist (like the straight stick) but we are constantly seeing an illusion. But that’s not all.

Even if we are not always seeing an illusion, the case of the glass in water is the only case we need. Because we can make a very strong argument that there is a contradiction and so we are not seeing the actual stick, and if we make this claim in a worldview framed by esse is percipi then we have done a lot more then just change the appearance of the stick. We’ve destroyed, and have resurrected a small part of the universe (if you’re a certain type of monist that would involve destroying indestructible monads, how embarrassing).

In Section One we asked why the argument from illusion has traditionally been formulated in a certain way. If there is one reason it should be formulated as AFI2 this is it. But while this is a way of disproving the idea that whatever is, is perceived it is not the means
Moore used to disprove it.
Moore makes the claim that: the idealist merely assumes that what is is the same as what is perceived (1.∃xBx 2.∃xPx, where x= object, B= being (esse), and P= perceived (percipi)). But
Moore says not only do idealists merely assume this; they also don’t assume it and there exists a good reason not to assume it. He says this:

“I am suggesting that the Idealist maintains that the object and subject are necessarily connected, mainly because he fails to see that they are distinct, that they are two, at all. When he thinks of ‘yellow’ and when he thinks of the ‘sensation of yellow,’ he fails to see that there is anything whatever in the latter which is not in the former. This being so, to deny that yellow can ever be apart from the sensation of yellow is merely to deny that yellow can ever be other than it is; since yellow and the sensation of yellow are absolutely identical. To assert that yellow is necessarily an object of experience is to assert that yellow is necessarily yellow—a purely identical proposition, and therefore proved by the law of contradiction alone. Of course, the proposition also implies that experience is, after all something distinct from yellow—else there would be no reason for insisting that yellow is a sensation: and that the argument thus both affirms and denies that yellow and sensation of yellow are distinct, is what sufficiently refutes it.” (442)

So this demonstrates that esse is percipi is analytical truth (because it is a statement of identity) so to prove its validity we must claim that esse simply equals percipi. But the argument advanced by the idealist doesn’t do this at all. The end result is that argument forwarded by the idealists disproves itself. To summarize formally: the idealist must assert: 1.∃xBx 2.∃xPx 3. P=B, where x= object, B= being (esse), and P= perceived (percipi). But what they in the end assert is not 3.P=B but P≠B. Not only do they assert it but we assert it and for good reason. The common man thinks there is something very different between the wavelength that is yellow, and the sensation of yellow and so should we.

Summary

After a brief overview of what idealism is (the belief that everything is reducible to the mental), the section highlights the fact that idealism, historically, is based off the preposition that ‘esse is percipi’. The paper points out that if one accepted this as the case the argument from illusion would not merely be an argument making an epistemological claim but also ontological or metaphysical one as well. But the paper also points out the fact that the argument from illusion is an argument by Russell, while
Moore takes a separate but complimentary and earlier approach. The section then explained that ‘esse is percipi’ is an analytical truth but is self-defeating because idealists assert that ‘esse’ and ‘percipi’ are distinct. (
Moore’s paper makes it seem just as foolish to assert ‘esse is percipi” is a synthetic statement so in the end there doesn’t seem to be a way out.)

Sense-data (Part Three)

cranderson — Fri, 13 Apr 2007 22:56:40 +0000

Section Three: Motivation

The case has now been made for the fact that sense-data was merely the result of an error in language and not a solution mandated on the metaphysical level. So we have successfully addressed the primary logical questions involved. The remainder of this paper will be historical in nature, and will be an attempt to understand why Russell and Moore might have found the idea of sense-data appealing. It is my opinion that their unique motivations will play a crucial role in understanding how sense-data developed.

A common motivating factor for both Russell and Moore was there dislike for idealism, which is the doctrine that everything is mental (as opposed to physical or material). But while
Moore’s prime motivating factor –that I am aware of- was a dislike of idealism, Russell’s prime motivating factor was a dislike of monism. (One of the reasons contemporarily philosophy has such an extreme dislike of sense-data arises from the fact that contemporary philosophy is dominated by a monistic metaphysical school of thought known as materialism (the belief that all things are physical)). But what exactly is monism?

At its most general monism is a belief that everything is made out of one substance. Materialism will serve to demonstrate. A materialist believes that in the end everything is reducible to one type of substance: the material, or put more simply a substance that takes up space, has mass and all the other properties we associate with the physical. While a monism of this kind (known as substance monism) doesn’t sound awful, in Russell’s era people didn’t believe in substance monism but absolute monism or attributive monism (both of which will be dealt with in greater detail in the section on monism).

What is important to note is that the neutral sense-data envisioned by Russell and Moore met both parties needs. It allowed Russell and Moore to do away with idealism, but allowed
Moore to hold onto monism and Russell the chance to flirt with pluralism. The table from section two will once more illustrate:

Sense-data

Mind-dependent (mind= soul/non-physical)

Mind-dependent (mind= brain/physical)

Mind-independent

Summary

Having dealt with the primary logical issues involved in the argument form illusion, this section concentrates on the historical. By asking why Russell and Moore would adopt the argument from illusion, and why they viewed sense-data (as neutral) the way they did. The section pointed out that while
Moore was motivated purely by his distaste of idealism, Russell was also motivated by his dislike for monism. The section concludes by pointing out that these motivations perhaps played a role in the development of sense-data (in the early days) as a neutral entity.

Sense-data (Part Two)

cranderson — Thu, 12 Apr 2007 21:09:33 +0000

Section Two: Sense-data

Before jumping into a deeper analysis of AFI1 & AFI2 we need to address the issue of sense-data. Mainly what exactly is it? If we accept AFI2, sense-data is a non-physical thing unique from the relevant physical object. If we accept AFI1, sense-data would merely be something unique from the “straight physical stick”, this other entity could just as well be physical. So the question now becomes, which understanding of ‘sense-data’ is more accurate? My answer will be neither, and for the sake of this paper sense-data will be used in as a neutral term –for the moment. But for the sake of information I will make the claim that while Moore and Russell did not claim sense-data to be mind-dependent, many other philosophers have, but back to the arguments.

AFI1 and AFI2 both could establish the existence of a mind neutral sense-data. But AFI1 asserts the existence of a completely neutral sense-data, while AFI2 claims it is non-physical and is only neutral when it comes to questions of the mind. But another division is occurring here. AFI1 is not claiming sense-data to be mind-dependent or mind- independent (if mind-dependent the ‘sense-data’ resides in the mind, if mind-independent it resides in the world.) So those are the two questions we have to keep in mind about sense-data: “is it physical or non-physical?” and the separate but related question “is it mind-dependent or mind-independent”? For the sake of clarity let’s look what the combination of these factors would give us:

Sense-data	Mind-dependent (non-physical)	Mind-dependent(physical)	Mind-independent
Physical	Dualism	Materialism	Materialism
Non-physical	Dualism	Dualism	Dualism

The table shows us that AFI1 & AFI2 both by default eliminate Idealism (the belief that all things are mental) because AFI1 and AFI2 both mention physical objects. (This is a question I’ll let simmer until the section on idealism.) So we now have some idea of the metaphysical questions involved. But know it’s time to turn back to the logic at hand.

Without thinking or AFI1 or AFI2 let’s think about the argument from illusion in general. Any formation of the argument from illusion is based off this simple problem:

There is a stick such that the stick is straight. (something like ∃xSx)
There is a stick such that the stick is not-straight. (∃x¬Sx)

This would involve a logical contradiction. So we are left with two options:

(The complete section is here section-tw1.doc)

Sense-data (Part One)

cranderson — Thu, 12 Apr 2007 01:43:38 +0000

Thesis Statement

Before the paper proper begins I wish to state as clearly as possible my thesis, which is multifaceted. The most important point I’m trying to make is that sense-data is a flawed concept, and that these flaws are the result of the historical factors that motivated Russell and Moore, which are perhaps still relevant.

Section One: Illusion

What is an illusion? Simply put illusion is when someone is deceived. When something appears to be but isn’t. Take for instance a circular coin. Given a difference of angle the same coin can look circular and look elliptical. When the circular coin looks elliptical an illusion is said to be taking place. This instance of illusion is local. And this can be said to be a basic example of the argument from illusion. But what exactly is the argument from illusion? Simply put it looks –something- like this:

AFI1

There exists a straight stick.
And there is an environment composed of two physical mediums.
The stick is placed in both mediums at once.
When the straight stick is in both mediums it appears bent.
But the physical stick remains the same: straight.
Therefore, the physical stick is not numerically identical to the appearance of the stick.

While AFI1 is a good way to look at the argument from illusion, AFI1 isn’t –apparently- a common way of looking at the argument from illusion. An example from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy will demonstrate:

AFI2

When viewing a strait stick half-submerged in water, one sees (or is directly aware of) something bent.
No relevant physical thing is bent in this situation.
Therefore, in this situation, one sees something non-physical.
What one sees in this situation is the same kind of thing that one sees in a normal (non-illusory) perception.
Therefore, in normal perception, one sees non-physical things.

As you can see, AFI1 and AFI2 come to very different conclusions. Both point out that the physical thing is not numerically identical to the appearance of the thing. (AFI1 explicitly states this, AFI2 implies it because if x was numerically identical to something y and x was physical and y was nonphysical then this would involve a logical contradiction.) But the importance is not the similarities but in the differences, AFI1 merely supports the presence of two objects. AFI2 supports not only the presence of two objects but also makes a claim about the nature of their existence (physical or nonphysical).

The differences between AFI1 and AFI2 demonstrate their inherent prejudices. AFI1 is attempting to lay the groundwork for a rejection of sense-data, while AFI2 is an attempt to justify the existence of sense-data. As you can see the way I set the problem out is very different from the way the argument from illusion has been traditionally set out. My question is why? Which will be addressed in the next section, along with the question: what exactly is sense-data? But before moving on, time for a quick summary.

Summary

An example of an illusion is when an individual sees a bent stick when really the stick is straight. The argument from illusion has traditionally been formalized in a style similar to AFI2, but AFI2 is biased. AFI1 is biased as well but the next section will attempt to show that AFI1’s biases are justified while AFI2 commits an error of logic.

On Sense-data

cranderson — Thu, 12 Apr 2007 01:41:03 +0000

I’ve just finished a draft for a philosophy class. I really, quite, like the paper and will be presenting it here in six parts. The paper deals with the argument from illusion and sense-data. Section One and Two treat the logic of the argument from illusion and the nature of sense-data. The remaining sections deal with historical aspects. The Paper isn’t heavy in logic, but having never taken a logic class it is perhaps a bit non-standard. While notation is used at times it is not used all the time.

Comments are welcome, and I hope to post an updated version sometime this coming summer.